Drums of Reconciliation, Drums of War
Efforts Between 1966 and 1967 to Persuade the South-Eastern Nigerian
Leadership
Not to Precipitate War
Oluwatoyin Vincent
Adepoju
Comparative
Cognitive process and Systems
“Exploring
Every Corner of the Cosmos in
Search of Knowledge
A myth that has
arisen around the Nigerian Civil War, particularly
among those who venerate the secessionist state of Biafra, is that the secession
was inevitable after the pogroms relating to the counter coup of 1966.
The
recent inflammatory summation of the place of Igbos in Nigeria in the pre-war,
war and post-war history of Nigeria by Chinua Achebe in his 2012 Guardian UK
essay on the war "The Genocidal Biafran War Still Haunts Nigeria"( the article has been removed from the Guardian site) led me to argue that Achebe is a bad leader for the Igbos he claims to
represent and those who follow him uncritically, as has been the current trend,
do so at their peril.
I will present, another time, on a wider
platform, my rationale for making that assertion. My central understanding is
that he is out of touch with the history and current situation of Ndigbo in
Nigeria. He massages Igbo pride but speaks only from a platform that has not
moved beyond the tensions of 1968, the heart of the civil war. His current views are
little different from those he
I earlier summed up
my critique in stating that a person who, like Achebe, in the Information Age
represented by 2012, focuses, without any accompanying critical context, on
importation of stock fish to Aba in the immediate post war years of 1971 and shortly
after, has lost the plot.
Ndigbo in Nigeria,
and Nigeria as a whole, is in desperate need of direction in terms of the
harnessing of human power and natural resources For Ndigbo, specifically, this need for vision and its actualisation involves
the South-East and the dispersion of Ndigbo across Nigeria.
I don’t get the impression that the Igbo marginalisation mantra based on a 1968 template as invoked by Achebe is particularly helpful as the answer to this challenge in a country where so many units are fighting for a share of proceeds from the centre.
I don’t get the impression that the Igbo marginalisation mantra based on a 1968 template as invoked by Achebe is particularly helpful as the answer to this challenge in a country where so many units are fighting for a share of proceeds from the centre.
I think that if one
insists on being an ethnic champion, focusing on the interests of your ethnic
group rather than those of the nation as a whole, such a broader vision being
the kind that would have been expected of an Achebe who had assumed the moral
stature of a Nigerian and African elder statesman, one needs a strategic vision
that takes an up to date account of the distinctive strengths of the group and
its location within the national space.
Is it possible to
divorce the challenges and possibilities of Ndigbo from those of Nigeria? Is a
national strategy not superior to an ethnically centred strategy? How do we
untangle the ethnic challenge from the complex web of national interrelations?
In contrasting
ethnic and national vision, it could be helpful to revisit Biafra and the
various roads taken and not taken in relation to its history.
The Biafran effort
was most admirable on various fronts and represents a beacon of value in
African history.
These achievement includeds Biafran ingenuity and unity of purpose in
creating technologies from the ground up in adverse conditions, technologies unreplicated in other African nations and even by the Biafrans themselves after
the war, such as cost efficient and portable methods of refining oil, the famous
explosive ogbunigwe and refabricating armoured vehicles, some of which
can be seen at the National War Museum at Umuahia.
However, Biafran achievement needs to be put
in context.
If the fantastic
energies represented by Biafra were centred in regional development instead of a war that Biafra was posed to lose from the
very beginning on account of limitations in equipment, human power and
territory in which to manoeuvre, what would have been the outcome as opposed to
the horrible story of death in massive numbers through starvation and combat?
True, the Biafra leader
may have had cause for fear about the modification
of the Aburi Accord which presented the possibility of a state of emergency
being declared in any of the states of the nation by the federal government,
thereby overriding the regional power from the centre and perhaps putting his
already traumatised population at risk.
Do the military and strategic limitations of
Biafra not suggest, however, that a wiser
strategy would have been to continue negotiations within a
framework that did not include secession which would take away the oil fields which have
eventually become central to the Nigerian economy, a situation made more
problematic by the fact that these oil fields are located in lands
whose populations were divided
over alliance with the secessionist state?
Anyway, the story
has come and gone. At this time, it is useful to look over the broken bottles
that cut one’s feet on the journey into the future represented by one’s past and
ask how could those bottles have been avoided? Was the scope of loss worth the
struggle? Was what was gained not better
achieved through a method that did not require such a level of sacrifice?
What if Adolf Hitler
had turned the massive creative powers he was able to inspire from Germany to
national development instead of to Jewish extermination and imperialist expansion? The world would be a different
place today because the global war that ensued from Hitler’s ambitions created
and enabled fundamental changes to the world, laying foundations for the modern
world.
I use that example, not because I correlate
Ojukwu and Hitler in leadership vision and style, but as leaders steering two strategic initiatives at
the cusp of national history, and with Hitler, global history, at differing
scales of influence. With hindsight these
efforts represent the harnessing of colossal national forces in directions that
may best be described as misguided.
In this
summation below, I present the sequence
of efforts to peacefully persuade Biafra to desist from secession and the challenge
of war that would ensue. One may ask-if they wanted to go-why not let them go?
The counter argument is not something I will pretend I fully understand since
there were various interests at stake and various motivations involved, within
Nigeria, Biafra and the international community.
The notion of preventing
the secession in the name of national
and continental integrity looks problematic to me. The rationale that looks
most meaningful to me is that of the contradictions between the efforts of Biafra
to claim a multi-ethnic status involving the entire South-East and the problematic
place of non-Igbo minorities in that alliance, as evoked by Ogoni leader Ken
Saro-Wiwa’s claim that the Biafran initiative was an Igbo land grab to control
the Niger-Delta oil fields and the controversial Midwest invasion which would
have opened further access to such resources, talk less the fears of Igbo
domination in the strategic port city of Port Harcourt and the later Rivers State.
This collusion
between economics and conflictual ethnicity was not helpful to the Biafran initiative
since it provided justifications for opposing it and weakened its internal
cohesion even before war began.
Now, to the timeline
of conciliatory efforts towards the South-East leadership before the declaration
of Biafra in 1967 and the commencement of fighting at the Ogota front that
year.
Reconciliation Efforts to Persuade South-Eastern
Leadership to Avoid War
: Timeline Between January 15,1966 Coup Anti-Yoruba and
Anti-Northern Massacres, the Anti-Igbo Massacres and Pogroms of the
29 July 1966 Counter Coup and the Commencement of Fighting in 1967.
1. Ntieyong Udo Akpan, Chief Secretary to
the Military Government, Head of the Civil Service and Member and Secretary to
the Cabinet of Eastern Nigeria till the end of the civil war in April 1967.
I appealed to [
Ojukwu ] in the name of God and humanity to throw away all idea of secession, which
was bound to bring up war. I expressed my views and feelings of the dreadful consequences
of civil war. I heard nothing further [about my proposal].
Source : Source-The
Struggle For Secession, 1966-1970: A Personal Account Of The Nigerian Civil
War By Ntieyong Udo Akpan.Page 80. [This section of the
book can be read free on Google books].
2. Nigerian government telegram of May 1966
to the South Eastern governor and later Biafran leader, Odumegwu Ojukwu. I highlight the pleading by
the government, most likely coming directly from Yakubu Gowon, the head of the Federal government.
extract-
'the constitution
can provide all safeguards necessary for state governments. Also programme
envisages immediate appointment of a revenue allocation commission to find new
formula on basis of principle of derivation and need to provide adequate funds
for essential government functions. Programme will ensure justice and fair play
for all the country.
Therefore I
earnestly appeal to you to cooperate to arrest further drift into
disintegration. On the basis of the foregoing, representatives of all governments can
meet without further delay to plan for smooth implementation of the political
and administrative programme adopted by your colleagues of the Supreme Military
Council. Most immediate.
Source-The
Struggle For Secession, 1966-1970: A Personal Account Of The Nigerian Civil War.p.82, by Ntieyong Udo Akpan, Chief
Secretary to the Military Government, Head of the Civil Service and Member and
Secretary to the Cabinet of Eastern Nigeria till the end of the civil war [This
section of the book can be read free on Google books].
2. Efforts
of James Cumes, Australian High Commissioner in Lagos to Broker
Reconciliation
I was Australian
High Commissioner in Lagos from August 1965 when I presented my credentials to
Azikwe, until August 1967 when I took leave of Gowon in Dodan Barracks and went
to the UN General Assembly then about to meet in mid-September in New York. In
October 1966, I travelled by road from Lagos to Enugu to talk to Ojukwu in an
attempt to help towards a peaceful settlement, end the massacres of the Ibos
and keep Nigeria intact. (You will see many newspaper and other media accounts
of my talks with Ojukwu at this time.)
I undertook these
talks with Gowon’s knowledge and consent. After my talks, the atmosphere
between Lagos and Enugu seemed to improve for a time and was one factor which
led to the Aburi Agreement in January 1967. That Agreement then fell apart,
largely I think because of problems Gowon had with it – or more accurately perhaps,
problems that those who kept him in power had with it.
As Ojukwu told me,
the great problem in reaching a peaceful settlement was, from the Ibo side, the
problem of dealing with the North after the appalling massacres of so many Ibos
on and after 29 July 1966. Could the Ibos ever really regard their fellow
Nigerians of the North as “brothers” after those terrible events?
3. The Federal
government delegation led by Obafemi Awolowo to Ojukwu on Saturday, May
4, 1967
A. Nowa Omoigui summary:
"Nonetheless on May 4th the National
reconciliation committee sent a delegation led by Chief Awolowo to Enugu to
find ways to defuse the situation. Among terms given to the committee (by
Ojukwu) for the participation of the East in peace talks were that there should
be 'an agreed agenda', 'an acceptable venue', a defined 'time limit', as well
as the termination of economic sanctions against the east and withdrawal of
northern troops from Lagos. When Chief Awolowo asked Ojukwu about the attitude
of Eastern Leaders to the North and the question of secession, Ojukwu's
response was "on the specific question of whether there is a possibility
of contact with the North, the answer is at the battlefield."
Source ; "May 30, 1967 " at the Igbo site
Kwenu.com.
B. Confirmation from Ralph Uwechue, Biafran Ambassador to
France and later head of Ohaneze Ndigo, the pan-Igbo organization:
When on 7th May 1967 the Yoruba leader came to Enugu at the head of a
reconciliation committee, Ojukwu had a handsome opportunity to play his card.
He missed. Dr. Michael Okpara who still enjoyed popular support in Eastern
Nigeria and whose friendship with Chief Awolowo had sustained the UPGA alliance
was not even invited to meet Chief Awolowo. After a hurried reception, Chief
Awolowo’s delegation left Eastern Nigeria. Ojukwu saw fit to describe the
mission as an “ill-conceived child.”
Source :Why Biafra
failed – Being excerpts from the book: Reflections
on the Nigerian Civil War – Facing the Future, written, by Chief Raph
Uwechue, president-general, Ohanaeze, the pan- Igbo socio-cultural
organization By Onouha Ukeh
UKEH Sun publications,
Saturday, October 24, 2009. Reprinted at https://lists.mayfirst.org/pipermail/friends/2009-October/006186.html.
C. Mobolaji
Aluko elaboration:
"....eminent
persons sent by Gowon (delegation led by Chief Awolowo) to persuade Ojukwu not
to lead Biafra to secede, at which point Ojukwu disclosed that the momentum to
secede was too far to stop the effort, that in fact his life would be in danger
if he broached a retreat, but that he believed that the secession would
be short-lived, and he would do everything in his power to make it so. Of
course, history proved him wrong, but these are some truths (if you will permit
me to be so blunt) that never come out in conversations..........."
Quotes from Aluko's presentation of the transcripts of the talks. I
highlight the pleading from Awo.
Aluko
introduction:
"Here is the true account of what took place as taken from
scriptsof the discussion between Papa and Chief Ojukwu (the Ikemba). The
discussion was taped by the Ikemba and the recorder was captured after Enugu fell.
On Saturday, May 6, 1967, at 5.15 pm, a meeting began to take place, at the
State House, Enugu, between the then Excellency, Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu (theIkemba)
and a delegation of the National Conciliation Committee (Committee) led
by the most Honorable Chief Obafemi Awolowo.
The Committee was
represented by Professor Samuel Aluko, Chief Mariere, Chief J.I. Onyia, while
the Eastern Region was represented by Lt. Col Imo, Lt. Col Effiong, Lt. Col.
Kurubo, Mr. C.O Mojekwu, Mr. N.U. Akpan, Professor Eni Njoku, Dr.
Nwakanma Okoro, Dr. P.N.C. Okigbo, Mr. C.A. Onyegbale and Mr. Ndem
with the Ikemba presiding over the meeting.
Awo: The
main concern of these delegates is to ensure that Nigeria does not
disintegrate, and I would like to see Nigeria bound together by any bond
because it is better than breaking the whole place up because each unit will be
the loser for it. The economy of the country is so integrated that it is too
late in the day to try and sever them without risking the death of one or both
of them. So we have come, therefore, to appeal to you to let Eastern
representatives attend the meeting of the Committee (ON-GOING NATIONAL
CONCILIATION MEETING) .
I do not want to put
myself in a position where I will be treated as an advocate of the Eastern
cause. Let the Eastern delegates go there, make their case and then as a member
of the Committee I will get up and say I support this entirely. If at the
meeting the East and West present what they want for a new Nigeria whether
temporarily or permanently, and the North says "no, we are not going to
have it", I will go out and address a World Press Conference and send our
case to that body and say this is what we have done and the North has turned it
down. I will then take any step that is necessary to bring into effect what we
want. The North needed to be in a position of being presented with the United
front of the South.
.....
The issue at hand is
not enough for us to say that we do not like the North. That is a negative
approach. I think a positive approach will be for us to meet. Unity will
last only if it is based on common understanding among us and the basis will
start at this meeting. As I said before, I want you to give me a chance of
meeting your people regularly. Let us resolve our differences and get what we
want and quickly too.
......
Awo: You have talked
about Easterners and Northerners trying to go to the same meeting and bringing
about reconciliation because they are the two warring parties. I do not
think the fight is between the East and the North alone. It affects all
other parts of the country save that there is no quarrel between the East and
the West and Mid-West. The fight involves all of us.
The West at this moment, has its own
complaints against the North. The fact that we went there particularly so soon
after my withdrawal from the Ad Hoc Constitutional Committee, which I observed
was set up by the Federal Government to wage war against the East instead of
trying to put things in check, must assure you that we are resolved to
find a solution to this.
Aluko comments by
quoting Saro-Wiwa's On A Darkling Plain, Wiwa, being
an actor in the events of the time:
... Page 78 of Saro-Wiwa:
"It cannot be believed that the [AWOLOWO'S ENUGU] delegation was expected
to achieve much. They probably obtained certain promiese from Ojukwu, for they
returned to Lagos with proposals which were said to have been agreed by
Ojukwu.
The Federal
Government was to lift the economic blockade placed on the Eastern Region in
some respects, a gesture which Ojukwu would reciprocate by abrogating some of
the laws he had passed confiscating certain properties and assets of the
Federal Government.
Gowon, acting in
good faith, immediately accepted the proposals and began to implement them. But
Ojukwu had no intention of accepting any proposals whatsoever, except that
which was by now uppermost in his mind: secession.
Source : MADIEBO PART 5: The Nigerian Revolution and
the Biafran War posted in in Aluko Archives. Sat
May 26, 2001 4:20. Link : http://groups.yahoo.com/group/AlukoArchives/message/23
D. Nowa Omoigui
summation
"A
few days later on May 20, Gowon accepted the recommendations of the National
Reconciliation Committee. Although Ojukwu said he did not recognize the group
as constituted, members passed along his demands to the federal government.
After
consultations, therefore, Gowon announced on May 25, that the SMC had agreed to
withdraw non-Yoruba troops from Abeokuta and Ibadan and establish a crash
training program to increase the Yoruba representation in the Army. This had
always been a key demand of Ojukwu but was also later echoed by Yoruba leaders.
To
ease the process and avoid apprehension among the mostly northern soldiery, Lt.
Col Hassan Katsina (Northern governor), Lt. Col Joe Akahan (Chief of Staff,
Army) along with the Battalion Commander, Major Sotomi addressed the troops at
Ibadan.
The
plan was that they would mostly have departed Ibadan and Abeokuta by May 31,
some to Apapa and Ikeja in the Lagos area, while others were to be transferred
to the Jebba and Ilorin garrisons by train.
The
SMC, citing the status of the city as the federal capital, had rejected the
suggestion that northern soldiers be removed from Lagos as well. However,
events quickly spiraled out of control and none of this came to pass."
E. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe at a crucial meeting on secession, perhaps the fateful Consultative
Council in Enugu of May 26, 1967 where some describe the creation of Biafra as being decisively
agreed upon by delegates.
“Furthermore, Dr. Azikiwe had a
long standing-enmity with Ojukwu which had not healed and, as a long time
champion of One Nigeria, he refused to associate himself with the initial
declaration of independence, speaking against it in the Consultative Council in
Enugu and being shouted down by the younger elements for his pains.”
Source : Martin Dent
, “Nigeria: The Task of Conflict Resolution”, The World Today, Vol.
24, No. 7 (Jul., 1968), pp. 269-280.
Obi N. Ebbe in Broken Back Axle: Unspeakable Events In Biafra Xlibris
(November 17, 2010) chapter four, page 30 confirms this account of Azikiwe’s experience
at the council.
F. Dissent from Igbo intellectuals and members
of minority groups
Criticism,
though necessarily muted has come from certain intellectuals who continue
to define themselves as Nigerians and see Ojukwu as a mere Machiavellian
working to establish an isolated pocket of power and control without any real
vision. Their argument is that such a new State would be essentially no
different than the previous Nigeria. Contrary to the idea of the first coup, they
argue Ojukwu has enacted no real plan for a thorough transformation of the
society and that all present appearances suggest that the new State will again
exist primarily for the satisfaction of the political leadership, the Civil
Service and academic classes. In general this group sides with the minorities
and only sees a situation of real development coming out of association with
the rest of the Federation. However because of the present mode of government
much of this criticism has had to remain underground.
....
What is probably most clear, in all of this,
if Biafra does survive the present military fighting is that it will
be an unhappy place. The Ibo leadership will never be able to quell
the suspicions of the minority groups. The Calibar, Ogoja, and Rivers peoples
will continue to feel they are no more than a tool of Ibo survival, and
that Biafra is at the expense of greater possibilities for
self-development within a State-Federal framework. At the same time Enugu will
have to spend most of its energies suppressing rebellious internal interests
and being prepared to defeat new external threats. Under these conditions the
police state character of the present society will continue for a
longtime.
Source
: Stephen Vincent, “Should Biafra Survive?” Transition,
No. 32 (Aug. - Sep., 1967), pp. 53-57. 56 and 57.
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