Circumlocutions, selective presentations of facts and the
manipulations of same to rehabilitate persons who are clearly guilty
of perpetrating genocide against the then Biafrans would not take away
their culpability in the war crime and crime against humanity.
We are debating now because Chinua Achebe, a writer chose the channel
of the written word. What would happen if in future, the offspring of
those on whom genocide was visited decide to choose the violent
channel?
Come to think of it, all these efforts and time being spent in trying
to rehabilitate the perpetrators of the genocide could have been spent
to first openly own up to the crime, render apology and dedicate
selves to activities aimed at real reconciliations, rehabilitation and
reconstructions.
CAO.
On Oct 23, 9:26 am, Mobolaji Aluko <
aluk...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Dear All:
>
> The two Memorandums below immediately after the first full year (1968) of
> the Nigerian Civil War:
>
> (1) Memo 1: the National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger memo to
> President Nixon, of
> January 28, 1969 and
> (2) Memo 2: a CIA memo of January 29, 1969
>
> should be read and re-read within the two filters of (1) that it takes two
> to tango (tangle) in a war, and (2) of the three geo-chronological maps
> below:
>
> [image: Biafra_May_1967-and_January_
1970]
>
> [image: Biafra_progressive_reduction_
in_size_1967_1970]
>
> [image: Biafra_25_provinces]
>
> Facts are stubborn.
>
> And there you have it.
>
> Bolaji Aluko
>
> ______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
_______________
>
> *MEMO 1: US White House: Kissinger Memorandum to the President*
> *January 28, 1969*
>
> ______________________________
______________________________
______________
>
> Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Documents on Africa, 1969-1972
> Released by the Office of the Historian
>
> MEMORANDUM
> THE WHITE HOUSE
> WASHINGTON
>
> Tuesday, January 28, 1969
>
> MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
> FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
> SUBJECT: U. S. Options in Biafra Relief
>
> You asked for a study of the Biafra relief problem by January 28. A member
> of my staff prepared the attached survey. I have taken the liberty of
> underlining the most significant parts.
>
> Underlying is a sketch of the background of the problem with a useful map.
> I thought it important to trace in some detail the interplay between
> politics and food. Each of the following Tabs, however, is designed to
> stand alone for a quick overview.
>
> At Tab A. is a list of six basic realities of the U. S. involvement in the
> relief effort.
>
> At Tab B are the main options for expanding relief into Biafra. (The data
> here are drawn from recent AID and Defense studies, but the details of cost
> and availability might be subject to change in a formal, up-to-the-minute
> review by all agencies concerned.)
>
> Recommendation:
>
> That you authorize me to sign the NSSM at Tab C. This would get the
> bureaucracy moving toward consideration of alternative Biafra relief
> programs at an early NSC meeting.
>
> There are no exact numbers on the scale of the human tragedy gathering in
> Biafra. But all our sources do agree that more than a million people are
> likely to be in danger of starvation over the next 2-3 months. The disaster
> certainly overshadows direct U.S. interests in Nigeria. There would be no
> question about evacuating the 5500 U.S. citizens or sacrificing the $300
> million private investment on the Federal side if these stood in the way of
> relief. The heart of our dilemma, however, is that our instinctive moral
> concern and involvement with this tragedy cannot be separated from the
> political tangle -- either in the eyes of the two sides, or in the real
> impact of relief on the course of the war and its broader consequences for
> Nigeria and Africa. Policy must be measured in terms of (1) its effect on
> our ability to help get in relief, and (2) long-range damage as well as the
> immediate disaster.
>
> Background of the Problem
>
> The civil war is rooted in the failure of the first generation of
> British-tutored politicians to make something of independence and unity.
> While London and Washington poured in money and high expectations,
> corruption grew apace and decisions were drained of content by the tribal
> bickering that lay behind the facade of national parties. In one sense the
> first coup in 1966 was a classic effort by young officers to set things
> right. But they were also eastern Ibos who murdered with ritual flair a
> northern Hausa Prime Minister along with the Premiers of the Northern and
> Western States.
>
> An Ibo general stepped in and tried honestly to hold the union together for
> a year. But the coup leaders went unpunished and the spiral was rapid. Six
> months later the general was murdered and 30-40,000 Ibos were savagely
> slaughtered in the North. Young colonels in a coalition of West and North
> took over in Lagos. The East (2/3 Ibo, 1/3 minority tribes) took back a
> flood of terrified Ibo refugees from the rest of the country and talked
> secession. There followed a predictable sequence of mutual bad faith,
> mounting chauvinism and outflanking of moderates. The war began in July
> 1967. It has come down to a stand-off with the rebels -- rechristened
> Biafra -- holed up in the Ibo heartland, about half the territory they
> began the war with. The Feds out-number the Biafrans 2:1 in effectives, but
> French arms and higher morale give the rebels parity for the present.
>
> The Two Sides
>
> Federal Military Government (350, 000 sq. miles, 47 million). General Gowon
> -- 36, Sandhurst-trained, devout Baptist -- rules almost literally by
> unanimity over a tenuous coalition increasingly strained by the standoff.
> The Western Yorubas, about 1/3 of the coalition, are stirring ominously in
> tax riots and seditious talk by local politicans. The army seems to remain
> reasonably solid, if not tightly controlled from Lagos. There is an urge
> for unity among the elite of all factions, though the strongest cement at
> this point is probably common tribal hatred of the Ibos. The Feds have
> cultivated a little elan in discovering they could run the country without
> the Ibos, who were the backbone of commerce and civil service in the north
> as well as the south. The Nigerians are proud and latently xenophobic, with
> a special rancor toward the U.S. that comes of being a guilty offspring who
> disappointed parental hopes.
>
> They conduct the war with often incredible ineptness both in battle and
> public relations. They tolerate the Red Cross relief operation on both
> sides but would hardly be averse to winning by starvation. They were
> outraged by the recent U.S. sale of eight old transports to the Red Cross
> and other relief agencies. For Gowon's regime the logic is simple: food
> keeps the rebellion alive as well as the rebels.
>
> Current Position: The Feds still insist that Biafra must renounce
> sovereignty before they'll talk peace in earnest. Within a "federal
> structure" they have talked about schemes for Ibo protection, including an
> international police force. But they are vague on questions of political
> amnesty and the place of Ibos in the future federal army. They see the
> outside world, and particularly us, drifting toward the rebels out of evil
> design or misguided sympathy. They feel their own war-weariness, are
> frightened and emboldened by it, and are probably very near a xenophobic
> outburst which would find an external scapegoat for their frustrations. Our
> eight transports almost triggered it. Recent intelligence indicates that
> the Feds plan a major offensive in March before the spring rains bog
> everyone down. Barring a real escalation in weaponry or expertise from
> outside sources, their prospects of breaching the rebel perimeter are still
> slight. That failure would bring Lagos to the boiling point.
>
> Biafra (3, 000 sq. miles, 4-6 million). Colonel Ojukwu -- 35,
> British-trained, erstwhile playboy -- presides over the popular support and
> military morale of a people convinced that defeat means extinction. The
> Ibos are the wandering Jews of West Africa -- gifted, aggressive,
> Westernized; at best envied and resented, but mostly despised by the mass
> of their neighbors in the Federation. They have fought well (by African
> standards) against heavy odds; their cynical public relations use of the
> starvation has been brilliant.
>
> Current Position: Ojukwu says in one breath his sovereignty is not
> negotiable, yet in the next talks about a compromise "confederation" or
> "commonwealth" which he never defines. He has ruled out the British as
> mediators and distrusts the OAU, just as the Feds accept-it, because of its
> pro-Federal stance. Biafra proffers a "ceasefire" knowing that neither
> Gowon nor his coalition could survive a hiatus which only gave a respite to
> the rebel-lion. The rebels seem more aware than before of their desperate
> food situation, but are convinced they can hold out (or will be bailed out)
> until the Feds collapse. Short of that, Biafra is almost certainly unable
> to win the war militarily. If Gowon (as he likes to see himself) is Lincoln
> fighting it out in the Wilderness with draft riots and copperheads back
> home, Ojukwu is Jeff Davis before Gettysburg with time on the side of
> secession.
>
> Relief and Diplomacy
>
> The immediate food crisis is on the Biafran side, which has been reduced to
> a 70- by 40-mile enclave in Federal-held territory. The only relief access
> is to the one working airstrip used for both arms and relief flights at
> night only. The planes come from two small islands off the coast. The
> religious voluntary agencies (some U.S., some European) fly from Portuguese
> Sao Tome. But Portugal has been sympathetic to Biafra and occasional arms
> flights also go in from Sao Tome. The Red Cross had been flying from
> Fernando Po until stopped last week by their landlord, the government of
> Equatorial Guinea. That problem is a mixture of high-handedness by the
> Swiss Red Cross people, perhaps some pressure on the Guineans from the
> Feds, and mostly the urge of a new and uncertain black regime to show the
> white men in their midst who's boss. State is hard at work on this. The Red
> Cross should be able to "rent" a grace period to continue flights until an
> agreement is negotiated.
>
> For the moment, deaths have probably gone down in Biafra as a result of the
> 300 tons or so of protein concentrates flown in per week before the block
> on Fernando Po. But the fall harvest in Iboland is being consumed, and they
> face a carbohydrate famine which will have still greater impact on the
> population and require much greater bulk than the present relief airlift
> could possibly handle. The tortuous politics of relief boil down as follows:
>
> -- Both sides have obstructed relief, but the balance of guilt rests with
> Biafra. In part, there are military priorities over food, but in the last
> account the rebels know well there's political profit in going hungry.
>
> -- Biafra blocks daytime relief flights (which could substantially increase
> deliveries) because they're afraid Fed MIGs will tailgate and knock out the
> airfield (which the MIGs avoid at night or in daylight when anti-aircraft
> is free to shoot at anything in the air.) The rebels also enjoy the "cover"
> their arms flights get from relief planes at night, should the Feds grow
> bolder after dark.
>
> -- The Feds endorse daytime flights in principle (to isolate the night arms
> run and maybe get a daytime crack at the field despite pledges to the
> contrary). But they regard (with reason) the voluntary agencies flying from
> Portuguese Sao Tome as pro-Biafran potential gun-runners, and thus illegal.
> And they don't want the Red Cross, which they do accept, flying in the fuel
> necessary to distribution of food.
>
> -- The Feds want the airlift to operate from Federal territory, which would
> let them inspect the food for hidden arms. Biafra argues a Federal-based
> airlift means poisoned food (a potent fear in West Africa) and at very
> least that relief would be hostage to their mortal enemy. The relief people
> contend a Federal base will (a) hamstring their flights where military
> operations would take precedence in already overtaxed facilities, (b)
> cripple what does go out with endless bickering over what's relief (fuel,
> spare parts, tools) and what's military.
>
> -- The Biafrans oppose an overland corridor unless it's policed by an army
> as big as the Feds' to prevent a sneak breakthrough. The Feds talk about a
> corridor -- again, in principle -- but manage objections to specific
> proposals and usually demand prior agreement by the rebels.
>
> Over all this are two hard facts about the total relief picture:
>
> 1. Without either (a) a major enlargement of the present airlift (air
> drops, building another "neutral" airstrip inside Biafra, etc.) which would
> bring a break between the Feds and the relief operation or (b) a land
> corridor, we can only scratch the edges of the food crisis soon upon us.
>
> 2. Of the 4 million people ,now existing on outside relief and medicine,
> easily half are dependent on the continuation of the International Red
> Cross (read white - foreign) operation in Federal-held territory.
> Where Others Stand
>
> The British could change things dramatically if they gave the Feds covert
> help with pilots to interdict the arms flights into Biafra. We have
> evidence they may have been trying that half-heartedly, but there are no
> results and time is running out for Gowon. Otherwise, London tries to look
> as energetic as possible to quiet backbench critics. The British have no
> real negotiating leverage in spite of -- or because of -- their arms supply
> to the Feds.
>
> The French are behind the arms flights from neighboring Gabon that save the
> rebels. They think the Feds will break up first and they'll have a dynamic
> new client amid the wreckage of an Anglo-American dream in Africa. It's a
> cheap investment -- justified so far by events and, one suspects, de
> Gaulle's romantic taste for underdogs.
>
> The French have responded to US urging and Red Cross pleas by saying
> finally they'll approach Ojukwu on accepting daytime flights. But there is
> no sign, and much evidence to the contrary, that they're backing off from
> their gamble on Biafra's survival.
>
> The Soviets jumped in as arms suppliers to the Feds after we declared an
> embargo on both sides and the British were slowed by Parliamentary
> conscience. Gowon is at pains to assure us that Moscow is a temporary
> patron of last resort. So far, in fact, the Soviets have little to show for
> their MIGs and unskilled Egyptian pilots. But they too hold the key to
> interdiction with a few pilots who can fly the MIGs at night. The most
> recent CIA estimates are that Moscow is content to wait for the right
> moment, if ever, to play that trump.
>
> Obviously, the Soviets don't have a vital interest in Nigeria, and they may
> shrink from greater involvement as the war drags on and their new clients
> in Lagos weaken. Despite their aid, they're prey eventually to the general
> xenophobia awakened in Nigeria by the war. But the Soviet move to become an
> arms supplier must be seen in several lights: (a) in contrast to their
> low-profile, de facto retreat from Africa in the last five years; (b) in
> the wider context of new foothold in the Middle East; (c) as a response to
> our own discomfort in Nigeria and the "long-reach" mentality in some Soviet
> quarters; and (d) for its impact on the U.S. public and Congress (so far,
> slight).
>
> The Africans. All but four of the OAU (Ivory Coast, Gabon, Tanzania,
> Zambia) support the Feds. The latest OAU Summit Resolution at Algiers in
> September reaffirmed the stand. Nigeria's plight is seen as a Pandora's box
> on a Continent where 2,000 ethnic groups are squeezed into 41 states and
> secession is a recurrent nightmare for most leaders. The balance of forces
> is too varied country-to-country for Africa to splinter if Biafra makes it.
> Yet a rebel victory would probably invite imitation in several vulnerable
> spots.
>
> The odds are heavy it would at least tear apart the rest of Nigeria.
>
> Real or imagined, fears about the war's impact are widespread among
> Africans. They want the war over as much as we do. But they have no real
> leverage on either side,. and Emperor Haile Selassie has all but exhausted
> his prestige in four different rounds of abortive talks. We and the
> Africans have talked a lot about their solving their own problems; this one
> is just too hard and came too early before power caught up with good
> intentions.
>
> U.S. Congress and Public: I need not describe this in detail. The public
> outcry has been passionate if not always sophisticated. On the Hill the
> Problem joins unlikely allies such as Kennedy and McCarthy, Brooke and
> Russell, Lukens and Lowenstein. The pressure has been intense; it is bound
> to grow. Senator Kennedy is now all but calling for an independent Biafra.
> The public campaign is well-financed and organized -- an amalgam in part of
> genuine concern and left-wing guilt feelings over Vietnam. The same people
> who picket on our "interference" in Asia also demand we force-feed the
> starving Nigerians.
>
> U.S. Policy and Options
>
> BASIC REALITIES
>
> 1. We must not be enmeshed in irrelevant experiences of our past
> involvement in Africa. Others -- most notably the Congo -- have put down
> secession and minimum U.S. help (a few C-130's in quick operation) made a
> difference. Unlike most in Africa, this is a real war.
>
> 2. At the very minimum -- for moral reasons let alone domestic politics
> --we must mount every reasonable effort to get in relief. But we must
> decide what is "reasonable" in terms of long-range damage as well as the
> immediate disaster.
>
> 3. Our role is important but it alone will not ensure a solution. We have
> little leverage beyond threats or promises of greater embroilment. Neither
> national interest nor national security justifies U.S. military
> intervention. There is no prospect that U.S. military intervention -- with
> the political disaster it would bring -- would solve the relief problem.
>
> 4. To the degree we have leverage, we have it only with the Feds. We need
> their active cooperation in one half of the relief effort and at least
> their tacit acceptance in the Biafran half to avoid a military clash. We
> need their trust for any peace-making role we might assume. The relief
> effort and our political influence can survive the continuing displeasure
> mixed with hopeful expectation about our role in Biafra. Neither relief nor
> influence would survive a break with the Feds.
>
> 5. There is at least an even chance an outright Fed military victory would
> bring some slaughter of the Ibos. The rebel charges of genocide are
> exaggerated and unproven. Gowon is an honorable man who knows Nigerian
> unity would be lost if victory led to mass murder. But he may not be able
> to bridle his Northern troops fresh from the bush. "One Nigeria" is
> probably still possible, but we must be prepared to deal with some
> possibility of atrocities as a result, or scuttle the concept as carrying
> an unacceptable risk of "complicity" in supporting the Feds even
> diplomatically.
>
> 6. The passage of time as starvation grows and Fed coalition weakens --only
> reduces our options. A rapid end to the war is the best way to save most of
> the people now threatened by starvation. We simply don't know how long the
> Biafrans can live with current prospects, or how long the Fed coalition
> will hold together. The odds are now that the coalition will outlast the
> food, but it's close.
>
> RELIEF OPTIONS
>
> The Need (This does not deal with the 2-3 million people in Federal
> territory, where presently there are no problems of access.)
>
> Estimates vary widely because of the very fluid situation in Biafra. Also,
> State has shrunk from sending in a relief expert for fear (probably
> well-founded) of trouble in Lagos, and we must rely on private figures and
> fragments from one or two CIA sources. Put together, the relief agencies,
> UNICEF, CIA, etc. see the need as follows:
>
> Population in danger in Biafra -- 1. 5 to 3. 5 million over next 4-6 mos.
>
> Relief needed (based on minimum caloric needs, and adjusted for bulk
> carbohydrate shipments) -- 30 to 40, 000 tons per month
>
> In practical terms, these are obviously wide ranges. But until (if ever) we
> have more documented figures, our relief experts accept these and advise
> that we prepare for the high -- or worst -- calculation.
>
> Present Airlift (assuming resumption of Red Cross operation from Fernando
> Po)
>
> Night flights, 15 - 18 planes = 4, 000 tons per month maximum
>
> Conditions: -hazards of night operation
> - intermix with arms flights and vulnerability to Fed attack
> - insufficient air-ground control
> -limited capacity of present aircraft
>
> Result: Actual deliveries have never reached the capacity of 4, 000 tons.
>
> Options
>
> 1. STEP-UP ONE
>
> Substitute larger planes = 8, 000 tons per month maximum available
> commercially
> Conditions: - Same as present airlift above
> - added airfield maintenance on islands and in Biafra
> Cost: $3 - 4 million for lease or sale of aircraft
>
> TAB B
>
> 2. STEP-UP TWO
>
> Dayflights, substitute = 12, 000 tons per month maximum 15 C-130-type
> aircraft
> Conditions: - major improvement of airfield facilities in Biafra and on
> islands
> -Biafran agreement to day flights or construction of second airfield
> -recruitment of new crews, probably making necessary use of U.S. military
> personnel
> Cost: $16 million per month for operations
> $2-3 million for airfield improvement or construction
>
> 3. STEP-UP THREE
>
> Add Air Drops to Step-Up Two = 23, 000 tons per month maximum with 10 more
> C-130-type aircraft
> Conditions: - additional base airfields since islands at capacity in
> Step-Up Two
> -additional personnel (100 - 200) again involving U.S. military
> -additional ground control to insure distribution in Biafra
> Cost: $36 million per month for operations
> $3 - 4 million ancitipated rental for additional fields
>
> 4. STEP-UP FOUR
>
> Day flights, 35 aircraft = 30 - 40, 000 tons per month maximum with 17-ton
> capacity
> Conditions: - Major involvement U.S. military personnel and aircraft
> - Security and maintenance usually requested by Joint Chiefs
> -Massive reconstruction of present airfields (amounting to U.S. take-over)
> -Major improvement distribution facilities in Biafra
> -Biafran agreement to day flights or second airfield
> Cost: est. $200 million minimum total for 3-4 months
>
> TAB B
>
> 5. STEP-UP FIVE
>
> Land relief corridor = 35 to 45, 000 tons per month maximum into Biafra
> combined with present relief flights
> Conditions: - Agreement by Federal Government and Biafra
> --Some improvement of roads and bridges
> Possible provision of additional trucks and ferries
> --Improvement of port and storage facilities in Federal territory
> --Added distribution in Biafra
> Cost: est. $8 million per month for operations
>
> Political Constraints on Relief Options
>
> Each Step-Up would be heavily dependent on U.S. initiative, money and
> equipment. Most require U.S. personnel. Others have shown by now that they
> lack either the resources, the will, or both.
>
> STEP-UP ONE (substituting larger planes), by itself, would probably move
> the Feds to sever relations with us. The urge would be stronger in Lagos to
> eject the Red Cross, but they might continue operations in Federal
> territory at the price of discontinuing aid to Biafra.
>
> STEP-UP-TWO through STEP-UP FOUR would, by all estimates, definitely bring
> a break with the Feds. We must be prepared to (a) encounter military attack
> on relief aircraft, (b) sacrifice the Red Cross operation in Federal
> territory and take over the airlift ourselves, (c) have personnel subject
> to ground attack in Biafra by Federal planes and troops.
>
> STEP-UP FIVE (land corridor) would probably require (a) visible involvement
> of OAU or other Africans to mitigate Nigerian sensitivities to a heavily
> white operation and (b) manifestly workable guarantees against large-scale
> violation of the corridor to meet Biafran objections, or at least to
> satisfy world opinion that their objections were unreasonable in face of
> the need for food.
>
> NSSM 11 directed the preparation of papers on 1) alternative approaches and
> programs for expanding relief and 2) alternate views of the U.S. interest
> in Nigeria and Biafra.
>
> END
>
> ______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
____________
> *
>
> MEMO 2: CIA Intelligence Memo: The Biafran Relief Problem
> *
>
> *29 January 1969 *
>
> ______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
_____________
>
> Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Documents on Africa, 1969-1972
>
> Released by the Office of the Historian
>
> DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
>
> Intelligence Memorandum
>
> THE BIAFRAN RELIEF PROBLEM
>
> 29 January 1969
>
> No. 0611/69
>
> CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
>
> Directorate of Intelligence
>
> 29 January 1969
>
> INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
>
> The Biafran Relief Problem
>
> Summary
>
> Biafran relief has become a charged inter-national issue that could
> severely strain and possibly rupture US-Nigerian relations. There is very
> little reliable information on the actual number of refugees or on the rate
> of starvation in Biafra, but it does appear that the situation will worsen
> within the next few months. The plight of the refugees has not had any
> significant effect on the policies of either side in the civil war, but the
> Biafrans use it for propaganda purposes, and at least some Nigerians favor
> starving the Biafrans into submission as the best war policy.
>
> As the war drags on, the federal authorities will probably become
> increasingly suspicious of foreign involvement in Biafran relief, and may
> feel compelled to react strongly against foreign countries backing
> stepped-up relief to the secessionists. Violent anti-US demonstrations
> could also occur.
>
> Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the
> Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Economic
> Research, the Office of National Estimates, and the Clandestine Services.
>
> The Seriousness of the Food Problem
>
> 1. The area now under Biafran control is approximately one fourth that of
> the former Eastern Region which Colonel Ojukwu led into secession in May
> 1967. As a result of the Ibo exodus into Biafran-controlled territory as
> federal forces advanced, the population in present-day Biafra has increased
> from a prewar four million to somewhere between six and seven million. Even
> before the civil war this particular section of the Eastern Region was a
> densely populated area de-pendent on imported food.
>
> 2. There is unquestionably starvation in the Biafran-controlled area and in
> the areas of the former Eastern Region overrun by federal forces. The
> number of deaths from starvation appears to have risen sharply during the
> period from last July through October. Deaths probably numbered in the
> hundreds of thousands, but ac-curate figures are not available. These
> deaths presumably occurred mostly among the very old, the young, and the
> sick, After October there was an apparent de-cline in deaths from
> starvation probably because of an improvement in the food distribution
> system, the in-creased airlift of food by relief organizations, and the
> fact that the main yam harvest occurred at this time.
>
> 3. Forecasts on the seriousness of the starvation problem in the coming
> months range from a relatively low death rate to those predicting mass
> starvation. The US Embassy in Lagos has estimated that by July some 3.5
> million Biafrans and some 2.25 million refugees in federal-held territory
> will be in need of food. Should the direst predictions regarding the food
> situation materialize and the worst circumstances prevail, some two to
> three million people in Biafra and in the federally occupied areas could
> die of starvation in the next few months. It does not appear that death
> from starvation will be anywhere near this serious, however. Moreover, a
> real if unmeasurable consideration in any such estimate is the Biafrans'
> ability to cope with the problem themselves. Colonel Ojukwu recently
> launched another campaign to increase food production, and it must be
> assumed that the Biafrans will turn their considerable ingenuity toward
> alleviating the problem.
>
> Sources of Assistance
>
> 4. Relief to the Biafrans has come mainly from Joint Church Aid (JCA), an
> association of religious relief agencies operating from the Portuguese
> island of Sao Tome off the coast of Nigeria, and until early this month
> from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) based in
> neighboring Equatorial Guinea. The unofficial Catholic charity
> organization, Caritas, has also sent some relief supplies from Sao Tome,
> and the French Red Cross operates relief flights from Libreville.
>
> 5. The ICRC operation was suspended early this month by the government of
> newly independent Equatorial Guinea for a variety of reasons, not the least
> of which is the unstable situation that prevails in this tiny former
> Spanish dependency. There is a large Ibo work force on Fernando Po, which
> the government of Equatorial Guinea fears is bent on subversion. Equatorial
> Guinea also believes it is under pressure by its much larger neighbor and
> has come down firmly on the side of Nigeria over the Biafran question. When
> the territory was under Spanish control, the ICRC operation worked
> smoothly. After independence last October, however, tension developed
> between ICRC officials and the Equatorial Guineans who have described the
> relief workers as arrogant and disrespectful of Equatorial Guinea's
> sovereignty. Equatorial Guinean Government officials have also indicated
> that they are receiving much less financial compensation for the ICRC
> operation than the Spanish did. Foreign Minister Ndongo has indicated that
> his country would consider reopening the airlift if the proper financial
> compensation were forthcoming. It is by no means certain, however, that he
> was speaking for his government, particularly the highly volatile President
> Macias, who has publicly committed himself not to permit ICRC night flights
> and who seems bent on using this issue to underscore Equatorial Guinea's
> independent status.
>
> 6. All relief flights by the JCA and ICRC have been made at night. The
> Biafrans refuse to open their one operating airstrip to day flights,
> fearing that the Nigerians would use this opportunity to land troops on the
> airstrip. Also, the Biafrans want to continue night relief flights as a
> cover for separate arms flights. The ICRC had been transporting
> approximately 80 tons of relief supplies per night to the Biafrans, while
> the JCA is presently carrying about 100 tons of relief supplies nightly.
>
> Nigerian Attitudes on Relief
>
> 7. Nigeria has reluctantly accepted the need for foreign participation in
> the Biafran relief effort, but Lagos has always been suspicious of the
> activities of the foreign relief agencies involved. Lagos would prefer that
> all relief be channeled through Nigeria, and, ideally, through Nigerian
> relief organizations. The federal authorities tacitly sanctioned the
> principle of daylight flights by the ICRC from Equatorial Guinea, but have
> never given their approval for night flights. Indeed, last November Lagos
> implied that planes flying into Biafra at night risked being shot down.
>
> 8. The Nigerians object strongly to the JCA operation from Sao Tome, and
> with some justification. The JCA has completely bypassed Lagos in its
> operations, and arms are also being flown to the secessionists from Sao
> Tome. The same airplanes have been used for arms and relief flights, and it
> seems probable, although there is no definite evidence, that some of the
> planes have carried mixed cargoes. The JCA officials are definitely
> pro-Biafran and have not been too discreet about expressing these
> sympathies publicly.
>
> The Biafran Viewpoint
>
> 9. The Biafrans have said that they welcome relief from any donors, except
> Nigeria, the UK, and the USSR--the "unholy alliance" which the Biafrans are
> convinced is bent on the extermination of the Ibos. The Biafran insistence
> that relief not be channeled through Lagos results from the secessionists'
> unwillingness to appear dependent on Nigeria for anything, on a genuine
> fear that Lagos would poison the food, and on the probably justifiable fear
> that Nigeria would use relief supply channels, such as a land relief
> corridor from Nigeria to Biafra, for military purposes. The Biafrans have
> done all they can to alleviate the refugee and starvation problems, but the
> secessionist leader-ship has given no indication--even during the
> July-October period--of being moved by the problem to a more compromising
> position with respect to the secession issue.
>
> Prospects
>
> 10. As the war drags on, with a probable in-crease in starvation, the
> Nigerians are likely to be-come even more sensitive to "foreign meddling"
> over the relief issue. Some Nigerian leaders regard starvation as a
> legitimate weapon of war and see aid to the Biafrans as merely prolonging
> the fighting. Most Nigerians, and at least some federal leaders, regard
> foreign relief to Biafra as direct support to the secessionists in an
> attempt to Balkanize Nigeria. The strong adverse reaction that greeted the
> announcement in December that the US was furnishing C-97 aircraft--four to
> the ICRC and four to the JCA--provides evidence of the Nigerian attitude on
> this matter.
>
> 11. Federal leader Gowon himself probably under-stands the US position on
> relief, but he has made clear to the US ambassador that the Nigerian people
> regard it as aid and comfort to the enemy. US efforts to reopen the ICRC's
> operation from Fernando Po have resulted in a definite increase in anti-US
> sentiment in Nigeria. The Nigerians recently leaked to the press a US note
> strongly urging--Lagos termed it demanding--the resumption of the airlift.
> In the Nigerian press and radio, the fact that US Secretary Rogers held his
> first official meeting with the Equatorial Guinean foreign minister was
> portrayed as further evidence of a change in US policy on Nigeria.
>
> 12. Official Nigerian reaction to US efforts to increase relief to Biafra
> has thus far been confined to verbal expressions of displeasure. There has
> been stinging criticism of the US in the Nigerian press and radio, and some
> anti-US demonstrations have been held. It would seem likely that as the war
> continues, further efforts by the US on behalf of Biafran relief will
> provoke a dramatic increase in anti-US sentiment in Nigeria. This in turn
> would increase pressure on federal leaders to take strong official action
> against the US. In the highly charged atmosphere in Nigeria, further US
> efforts for stepped-up Biafran relief could also easily spark violent
> anti-US demonstrations that could threaten some of the 5,200 US citizens
> now resident in Nigeria.
>
> *
> *
>
> *Source:* *National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box
> 741, Country Files, Africa, 3/54. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in
> the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.*
>
